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Background of Sarbanes-Oxley 2002 
Out of the ashes of Enron arose Sarbanes-Oxley 2002. Enron began as a small 
gas pipeline company and quickly rose into corporate prominence, at one time reaching 
as high as seventh on the Fortune Fifty. While it is possible for companies to reach great 
heights in small amounts of time and do so legally, Enron chose the quickest path 
regardless of consequences. Often in the corporate world individuals in positions of 
power will take the risk that any financial reporting fraud they may engineer will never 
be discovered. In the 1970s and 1980s great emphasis was placed on a company's stock 
price. Stock began directly correlating to the chief executive officer's salary through a 
complicated system of executive stock compensation plans. These plans were of added 
financial benefit to the company, at least on paper, because most companies did not 
expense stock options. 
Also during this time analysts as well as investors demanded that a company's 
earnings rise steadily, in a predictable straight line. Any deviation, no matter how 
insignificant, would cause the stock prices to change. Growth in a straight line is 
virtually impossible; no company grows in constant increments. Another important 
element to remember when talking about corporations not meeting profit expectations is 
the executive's ego. The 90s created star-like executives, complete with private jets and 
Hollywood parties. Executives began to compete with each other with respect to 
personal income and perks. Improvement in corporate stock value led to increased social 
standing for the executives. Outside pressures along with the fear of failure can easily 
persuade a CEO to be creative with financial numbers. Enron created several off balance 
sheet financial agreements, which allowed the company to overstate revenues as well as 
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to understate expenses and liabilities. Merrill Lynch has recently pied guilty to assisting 
in establishing a deal in which Enron was to sell their financial holdings in a company but 
Enron actually put up most of the money themselves, taking almost no money from the 
other company. This allowed the company to create a false sale and a fake profit. While 
it is easy to see where Enron began to collapse and even easier to see where to place the 
blame, it is difficult to place blame on just certain individuals in a single company when 
similar situations began popping up in corporations across the USA. 
Geofferey Colvin offers criteria that lead to companies committing fraudulent 
acts. "The first element is a baby company's culture in a giant company's body. One of 
the most difficult phases in every company's life is growing from one person's reflection 
into an institution of its own"(Colvin, 2003). This situation refers to an entrepreneur who 
refuses to let the company expand to its own entity. Whenever something is to be done it 
must either originate with the original owner or be approved by the CEO. This creates an 
atmosphere in which employees do not feel able to approach the CEO about a possible 
idea or criticism. Outside auditors also seem to have an issue standing up to the 
executive. 
"The second element is personal greed, exquisitely disguised as a sense of 
entitlement. The founders and many others at these companies believed deeply that they 
deserved everything they got, regardless of how they got it, because they had created 
their success"(Colvin, 2003). Corporations of today are being run by individuals, many of 
whom consider themselves to be of an intelligence far surpassing any normal individual. 
Executive greed was enhanced by the reliance of corporate Board of Directors on huge 
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stock option compensation packages. These powerful individuals saw the company as 
their personal finance tool, to be used in any way at their discretion. 
"The third element is slavery to the Wall Street 
expectations machine. All these companies achieved huge 
valuations during the bubble, often trading at giant 
multiples. In such cases it takes only a quiver in underlying 
earnings to bring the stock price tumbling. So the standing 
order for executives within these companies was to make 
their number and meet Wall Street's expectations at all 
costs, especially because these founder CEOs would lose 
tons of personal wealth- to which they were entitled! - if 
the stock fell" (Colvin, 2003). 
The company became tied to the CEO's ego and sense of personal pride. If the 
CEO felt underpaid, well then he or she would have to create a boost in stock prices to 
raise their compensation worth; if the company's numbers became questionable, then the 
CEO would alter them in order to save face. 
It is important to note that just as author Colvin states, none of these criteria 
alone has the power to create a corporate crisis such as the one we find our business 
world involved in but that all three in combination must be present. 
Thus it seems simple to boil down the cause of the corporate turmoil to issues 
concerning corporate governance. Management of a company has a fiduciary duty to the 
investors. A fiduciary duty involves looking out for the best interests of another party as 
well as making decisions that increase their well-being. Remember that this is not the 
first time in history when investor confidence has been shattered. There are a number of 
issues in the disaster that is corporate governance that have led directly to this immediate 
crisis. Jorge Guerra gives a listing of the more common problems associated with 
corporate governance: 
• 
"executive compensation grossly disproportionate to 
corporate results, stock promotion that has gone to an 
extreme in the creation of very questionable or unproven 
business concepts, misuse of corporate funds, trading on 
insider information, particularly by managers exercising 
stock options that have been rewarded short-term thinking, 
misrepresentation of the true earnings and financial 
condition of too many companies, and obstruction of 
justice by concealing activities or destroying 
evidence"(Guerra, 2003). 
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It is easy to look through this list and find corporations in which a number of these 
problems existed and led to the company's ultimate demise. Enron was plagued by 
executive stock compensation, which eventually led to the leaders of the corporation 
selling their stock before the dissolution of the company while forcing employees to 
retain their shares eventually resulting in massive losses of retirement funds. 
Other companies also had problems with excessive executive compensation and 
perks. Let us not forget about the very expensive shower curtain, which furnished the 
housekeeper's bathroom, as well as the birthday party thrown for the executive's wife 
featuring a live performance by Jimmy Buffet, all paid for out ofTyco's business funds. 
It is important to realize that while the stock compensation and executive perks exposed 
by the financial woes of companies the size of Enron and Tyco may seem to be recent 
developments, the potential for these misuses of corporate power and funds is long-
standing. Seventy years ago, in the aftermath of the stock market crash, two researchers 
wrote about the danger of managers of large corporations being in a position to act in 
their own best interests, regardless of whether those interests are aligned with the best 
interests of the stockholders. These researchers warned against a situation in which the 
shareholders who own the company cannot adequately control the agents who manage 
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their property and warned that this was a danger of dispersion of ownership (Stelzer, 
2004). 
With blatant disregard for corporate ethics as well as the investing public 
occurring more frequently and with greater consequences, the government recognized 
that they must act quickly. Through the darkness and fog of corporate disillusionment 
came Sarbanes-Oxley. Two different bills were circulating through the House and the 
Senate after the economic earthquakes of the later part of 2002. However, it quickly 
became apparent the corporate turmoil was far from over and the politicians realized that 
something needed to be done quickly and a unified message needed to be sent. The two 
bills merged into Sarbanes-Oxley (referred to as SOX) and was quickly passed by the 
House of Representatives and the Senate. William Donaldson, the SEC Chairman, states 
that SOX "has been heralded by government officials as the most important securities 
legislation since the original federal securities laws of the 1930s, and it has effected a 
dramatic change across the corporate landscape to reestablish investor confidence in the 
integrity of corporate disclosures and financial reporting" (Guerra, 2003). 
Even with the law now in place it is imperative that people continue to support the 
movement to increase corporate responsibility and enforce what has been put into place. 
"The Act includes sweeping changes in the areas of 
corporate governance and federal securities law, including 
reporting obligations, in response to recent corporate 
scandals and bankruptcies such as those involving Enron 
and WorldCom. The Act seeks to prevent the reoccurrence 
of such scandals by increasing corporate accountability, 
enhancing financial disclosure, strengthening audit 
committees, and creating new and harsh criminal penalties 
for violations." (The Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2003: effect on 
the securitization industry, 2002). 
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Sarbanes-Oxley has been surrounded by a cloud of skepticism, but continues to 
forge ahead towards the goal of returning the corporation back to the shareholders. A 
difficult road lies ahead but two sections of the Act seek to add at least superficial support 
to investors by requiring top-level executives to put their own futures on the line and 
certify that the company's financial statements are to their best knowledge correct and 
non-misleading. 
Discussion of Section 302 of Sarbanes-Oxley 
Section 302 of Sarbanes-Oxley requires that CEOs and CFOs of all public 
companies certify each annual and quarterly report. "The certification states that to their 
best knowledge the report does not contain any untrue statement or omission of a material 
fact, and fairly represents in all material respects the company's financial condition and 
results of operations" (Sarbanes-Oxley certification requirements and best practices, 
2002). The securities legislation that was created back in the 1930s also sought to protect 
the stock consumers from misrepresentations by management. The idea of Section 302 is 
to reaffirm shareholder confidence; this has created a clash between professional levels. 
Executives are now being required to include any additional knowledge of underlying 
events as well as choosing the appropriate accounting methods that are in the best interest 
of the shareholder. The CEO and CFO sign a standardized form of certification, which 
may not be changed under any circumstances. The certification form is attached to the 
lOK report. 
According to the SEC (Sarbanes-Oxley certification requirements and best practices, 
2002) there are six different elements to the certification by the CEOs and CFOs: 
1. He or she has reviewed the periodic report 
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2. Based on his or her knowledge, the periodic report does not contain any untrue 
statement of a material fact or omit to state a material fact necessary in order to 
make the statements made, in light of the circumstances under which such 
statements were made, not misleading with respect to the period covered by the 
periodic report 
3. Based on his or her knowledge, the financial statements, and other financial 
information included in the periodic report, fairly present in all material respects 
the financial condition, results of operations and cash flows of the company as of, 
and for, the periods presented in the periodic reports 
4. He or she and the other certifying officer 
a. Are responsible for establishing and maintaining disclosure controls and 
procedures for the company 
b. Have designed such disclosure controls and procedures to ensure that 
material information is made known to them, particularly during the 
period in which the periodic report is being prepared 
c. Have evaluated the effectiveness of the company's disclosure controls and 
procedures as of a date within 90 days prior to the filing date of the 
periodic report 
d. Have presented in the periodic report their conclusions about the 
effectiveness of the disclosure controls and procedures based on the 
required evaluation as of that date 
5. He or she and the other certifying officer have disclosed to the company's auditor 
and to the audit committee of the board of directors 
a. All significant deficiencies in the design or operation of internal controls 
which could adversely affect the company's ability to record, process, 
summarize and report financial data and have identified for the company's 
auditors any material weaknesses in internal controls 
b. Any fraud, whether or not material, that involves management or other 
employees who have a significant role in the company's internal controls 
6. He or she and the other certifying officer have indicated in the periodic report 
whether or not there were significant changes in internal controls or in other 
factors that could significantly affect internal controls subsequent to the date of 
their evaluation, including any corrective actions with regard to significant 
deficiencies and material weaknesses. · 
Sarbanes-Oxley 2002 also discusses the concept of materiality. Materiality is really 
found "in the eye of the beholder" (Sarbanes-Oxley certification requirements and best 
practices, 2002). Information must stand up to the reasonable person standard. This 
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particular standard implies that information will be considered to be material in nature if 
the ordinary, reasonable user of the information would consider it when making 
decisions. 
The new legislation also proposes that management go above and beyond in terms of 
keeping shareholders informed. Governmental officials found it imperative that 
executives realize that merely conforming to generally accepted accounting principles 
(GAAP) would no longer suffice. According to the SEC in Sarbanes-Oxley Certification 
Requirements and Best Practices (2002) a fair presentation of a company's financial 
condition, results of operations and cash flows encompasses the following points: 
1) The selection of appropriate accounting policies 
2) The proper application of appropriate accounting policies 
3) The disclosure of financial information that is informative and reasonably 
reflects the underlying transactions and events 
4) The inclusion of any additional disclosures necessary to provide investors 
with a materially accurate and complete picture of a company's financial 
condition, results of operations and cash flows. 
"The statement also contains language regarding 
maintenance of disclosure controls and procedures. For 
purposes of the new rules, the term disclosure controls and 
procedures means controls and other procedures of a 
company that are designed to ensure that information 
required to be disclosed by the company in the reports file 
by it under the Exchange Act is recorded, processed, 
summarized, and reported within the time periods specified 
in the SEC's rules and forms" (Sarbanes-Oxley 
certification requirements and best practices, 2002). 
This new definition is included in order to comment on the importance of information 
disclosure. Companies must continue to maintain and update their commitment to 
keeping shareholders properly informed. 
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Discussion of Section 906 of Sarbanes-Oxley 
On the surface Section 906 may seem to be a mere continuation of Section 302 
but there are important differences to be noted. Section 906 exceeds the severity of 
Section 302 in that it imposes criminal sanctions "for knowingly false certifications" 
(Sarbanes-Oxley certification requirements and best practices, 2002). However, the 
certification requirements actually referred to in Section 906 are more specific than the 
requirements of Section 302. "The Section 906 certification represents that the periodic 
report which it accompanies fully complies with the requirements of Section 13(a) or 
15(d) of the Exchange Act and that the information contained in the periodic report fairly 
presents, in all material respects, the financial condition and results of operations of the 
company" (Sarbanes-Oxley certification requirements and best practices, 2002). 
Section 906 also carries harsh criminal penalties for violators. Any officer who 
makes the certification knowing that the periodic report does not comport with the 
requirements set forth can be fined not more than one million dollars or imprisoned not 
more than ten years, or both, or if the violation is willful, can be fined not more that five 
million dollars or imprisoned not more than twenty years, or both. 
While both sections discussed above have found themselves embroiled in 
controversy, Section 906 seems to raise the most concerns. One of the issues involves 
the placement of the certification form required for Section 906. Part of the problem 
hinges on the inclusion of the certification within the financial report and whether or not 
the executives would then potentially also be liable for civil penalties (Sarbanes-Oxley 
certification requirements and best practices, 2002). Even though the two sections are 
similar there has been no conclusive action to incorporate them into one certification 
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form and filing. Also there has been some controversy concerning the opinion that the 
Section 906 certification can be viewed as private conversation between the SEC and the 
particular company. As of now there is no penalty for failure to file a Section 906 
certification form and penalties can only occur if certifications are made and they related 
to false financial reports. 
August 14, 2002, was the date that the first signed certifications were to be turned 
m. "Cynics have called it 'restatement' day while others deemed it as inconsequential as 
theY2K threat. Optimists hope it will mark the end of the worst year for corporate 
scandals in recent memory" (Taub, 8/14/2002). In all about 947 companies must certify 
their statements but many companies had different deadlines due to the fact that they do 
not report on a calendar year basis. Several companies felt the need to revisit prior year 
figures and restate figures before signing off on this year's financials (Taub, 8/15/2002). 
"One theme seemed crystal clear-CEOs and CFOs don't want to go to jail" (Taub, 
8/15/2002). While the day passed with little additional scandal, it seems that 
shareholders were not incredibly swayed by the act of confidence. It may appear on the 
surface that not much had been affected by the first round of signatures; however, it is 
important to remember that Sarbanes-Oxley's impact will still have far reaching 
implications in the accounting environment. 
Discussion of Research Project 
When I began this research project I believed that I would find some major 
differences in reporting between the 2001 and 2002 financial reports of major 
corporations. My research question was, "What was the impact of the Sarbanes-Oxley 
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Act of 2002 on the corporate reporting of the top 50 corporations in America as identified 
by Fortune magazine." Each year Fortune magazine lists the top 500 public corporations 
in American with the rankings based upon revenues. The results of the 2001 financial 
reports of these corporations led to the 2002 listing in the magazine; the results of the 
2002 financial reports led to the 2003 listing. To narrow the research down to a 
manageable level, I decided to focus on the top fifty of these public corporations. These 
companies are listed in Appendix A. 
Once these corporations were identified, I needed to gather the information 
reported by these corporations. I focused my research on the annual reports of the 
companies as well as information retrieved from the SEC's EDGAR website. I gathered 
the 2001 and 2002 annual reports as well as 10-K filings for the companies included on 
the 2002 list. 
I set up an initial spreadsheet document to gather the information gleaned from 
these annual reports and SEC filings. I looked at the following specific information: 
1) Did these corporations file the required CEO and CFO statements with the 
SEC? 
2) If the corporations filed the required statements, were those statements 
found in the annual report to the stockholders or only in the filings with 
the SEC? 
3) What audit firm was used in 2001 and in 2002; ifthere was a change in 
auditor, what reasoning was given in the SEC filing? 
4) Was Sarbanes-Oxley mentioned in management's letter to the 
stockholders in the annual report; if so, what information was shared 
concerning the effect of SOX on the corporate reporting? 
5) Were there changes in the reporting and disclosure of related party 
transactions, or disclosures of joint ventures previously held off balance 
sheet? 
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6) How was executive stock compensation reported each year; if the method 
of reporting changed, what was the explanation given in the footnotes to 
the financial statements? 
As I read through these annual reports, focusing on the management letters and 
the notes to the financial statements, I began to realize that there were very few 
differences in the reporting between the two years. Of the Fortune 50 from 2002, only 
one (Enron) failed to provide the necessary statements to the SEC; only ten of these 
companies included the statements in the annual report while the others simply included 
them in the SEC filings. Other than those companies who had used Arthur Anderson as 
their auditor, there were only two changes in auditor reported. A few of the management 
letters included in the annual reports discussed corporate ethics and the ways in which 
those particular companies utilized an Audit Committee from the Board of Directors to 
enhance internal control. 
One possible conclusion from my research is that well-run corporations did not 
need to make sweeping changes to comply with Sarbanes-Oxley. A more likely 
conclusion is that Sarbanes-Oxley had just been passed and the reporting requirements 
were just being implemented; therefore, many corporations simply complied with the 
statement requirements for the CEO and CFO and will be making additional changes in 
the future. It is also very likely that Sarbanes-Oxley will have more of an impact on the 
public auditors than the public corporations. Public accounting firms are going to have to 
determine whether they wish to provide management advisory services or audit services 
to a corporation, and will have to change their fee structures so that audit services can 
stand alone financially rather than being subsidized by profits on the management 
advisory services provided to that corporation. 
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Realizing that I was not going to find the data to support my original statement of 
purpose, I decided to look again at Sarbanes-Oxley and its origin. After reading through 
many articles discussing the impetus for SOX 02, I realized that there were three main 
accounting issues that were at the center of the storm, so to speak: 
1) Off balance sheet financing and investing activities, such as those involving 
Enron that were not adequately disclosed to the users of the financial statements. 
Some of these activities involved related party transactions with inadequate 
disclosure and others disclosed the nature of the activity without disclosing the 
true level of risk involved. 
2) Executive perks and excess expenses, such as those involving Tyco executives, 
which seriously eroded company earnings. 
3) Stock based compensation plans for executives that often allowed top executives 
to pull in millions more in compensation than that reported to the users of the 
financial statements. 
Of these three activities that contributed to the atmosphere that led to Sarbanes-
Oxley, I decided to explore the area of stock-based compensation plans more thoroughly. 
In my opinion unexpensed stock options were a main factor in the corporate fallout. 
Stock options created a forest of money trees and unrestricted power. 
"Thanks to their free money allure, options made up more 
than 40 percent of executive compensation during the late '90s. 
This gave executives an enormous incentive to pursue risky, even 
illegal strategies to boost stock prices so they could exercise their 
options and immediately sell their stock" (Sweeney, 2001). 
This was one area that the annual reports had to address, either through the financial 
statements themselves or through the notes to the financial statements. 
For many years the authoritative pronouncement regarding the treatment of stock-
based compensation plans has been APB Opinion No. 25, Accounting for Stock Issued to 
Employees. Under APB 25 corporations were allowed to use the intrinsic value method 
in reporting compensation expense related to these stock-based compensation plans. 
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Under the intrinsic value method the value of a fixed stock option for reporting purposes 
is equal to the difference between the option exercise price and the market price at the 
grant date. So, as long as a corporation set the exercise price at the current market price 
of the stock, no expense would be recorded either at the time of option or the time of 
exercise. 
· So, as an example, let us say that Corporation X gives its CEO options on 10,000 
shares at $20 per share in 2000 when the market price is also $20 per share. No 
compensation expense would be recorded with respect to that grant. Now, if the CEO 
exercises those options in 2003 when the market price is $30 per share, the CEO will be 
receiving compensation of $100,000 ($30 - $20) times the 10,000 shares. Under the 
intrinsic value method, there would still be no compensation expense reported in the 
financial statements. 
The accounting profession has been concerned over this treatment of stock-based 
compensation plans and FASB began work on this issue in the early 1990s. In 1994 
FASB proposed that stock-based compensation expense be recognized annually over the 
life of the grant, with annual comparisons to the current market value of the options. As 
Warren Buffett stated in the 1993 annual report of Berkshire Hathaway, "If options aren't 
a form of compensation, what are they? If compensation isn't an expense, what is it? 
And if expenses shouldn't go into the calculation of earnings, where in the world should 
they go?" 
Under the fair value method ofreporting stock-based compensation plans, our 
previous example would have resulted in the actual expensing of the $100,000 during the 
two years that the option was in place. 
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This proposed statement set off a huge outcry from the corporate world that if this 
accounting policy was adopted corporations would have to take large hits to income as a 
result of these stock-based compensation plans, which they said would slow the 
economic growth of the country. These corporations went to their congressmen and 
women and the issue was debated in the House and Senate. The U.S. Senate threatened 
to legislate accounting rules ifFASB persisted with this change in accounting for stock-
based compensation, with one Senator remarking "I will not allow U.S. companies to be 
sacrificed for the sake of double-entry accounting rules; if necessary, we will legislate 
accounting rules" (Sweeney, 2001). 
FASB felt the better course of valor was to back off, and Statement 123, 
Accounting for Stock-Based Compensation, was issued. Statement 123 is very much a 
compromise statement. Corporations are still allowed to use the intrinsic value method of 
accounting for stock-based compensation plans; however, they are encouraged to adopt 
the fair value method. If a company chooses to continue using the intrinsic value 
method, they are required to disclose in a note the details of the option plans outstanding, 
including the exercise price, the length of the contract period, and the fair value of the 
options as well as what their net income would have been if they had used the fair value 
method. This somewhat mollified those accountants who believed that all compensation 
expense should be reported as an expense in the Statement of Earnings with the effect on 
net income clearly shown while allowing those opposed to the expensing of the options to 
keep the expense off the face of the Statement of Earnings. 
A few companies in the Fortune 50 of 2002 have already begun to adopt the fair-
value method of accounting for these stock-based compensation plans. These include 
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General Electric, Citigroup, Proctor and Gamble, and Warren Buffett's Berkshire 
Hathaway. Others, including AT&T moved to the fair-value method in their 2003 
reports. These companies are leading the way and are reporting this compensation 
expense on the face of the earnings statement. Some companies, including Microsoft, 
have discontinued the practice of compensating executives with stock options (Risen, 
2003). 
Other companies in the Fortune 50 are continuing to take the easy way out and are 
complying with the form rather than the spirit, of Statement 123. They are providing the 
information in a buried footnote, along with the pro forma information showing what the 
income would have been if the fair value method had been included. What has struck me 
as very interesting is that a few companies have gone into a belligerent, defensive mode 
in writing this footnote. 
"We are continuing to follow APB 25 with respect to 
reporting stock-based compensation plans. We provide the 
following information required by Statement 123 regarding 
changes to net income if expense had been recognized as a 
result of these plans. However, we continue to believe that 
stock-based compensation plans do not represent an 
expense to the corporation; these plans only have value if 
the executives assist in increasing shareholder value and 
therefore should only impact the shareholders' equity 
section of the balance sheet" (Wells Fargo 2002 Annual 
Report). 
An article in the December 2003 Journal of Accountancy noted that "many 
accounting experts think it is only a matter of time before companies will have to report 
stock options as an expense at fair value" (Myers, 2002). Many accounting experts are 
disappointed that corporations are merely following the letter of the law of Statement 
123, continuing to employ the intrinsic value method rather than moving toward 
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reporting under the fair value method of these stock-based compensation plans. In March 
2004 F ASB introduced a new exposure draft that is intended to lead toward option 
expensing beginning in 2005. The current SEC chairman is fully supporting this new 
standard (Loomis, 2004). 
Congress appears ready to get involved in this debate once again, this time on the 
other side of the debate. In the early 1990s, it was siding with the corporations in 
blocking FASB's efforts to require the use of fair value accounting for these plans. Now 
Congress appears ready to assist in encouraging corporations to adopt the fair value 
reporting method. A bill has been introduced requiring corporations to treat stock options 
the same way on its tax returns as it treats them on its financial statements. Currently a 
corporation has been allowed to use the intrinsic value method for its financial 
statements, showing no expense, while simultaneously being allowed to take a tax 
deduction for the value of the options. 
If F ASB does decide to require the use of the fair value method in expensing 
these stock-based compensation plans, another issue will immediately arise: what 
alternative pay programs should corporations consider? If one of the main reasons for the 
popularity of the stock-based compensation plans was related to the lack of an accounting 
charge on the books, once there is an accounting charge options are on a level playing 
field with other incentives. Corporations and their compensation committees will then 
need to look at the full range of compensation plans and select the one that best fits its 
goals. 
Summary of Research Project 
I began my exploration of Sarbanes-Oxley 2002 with the expectation that I would 
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find significant changes in the reporting of major corporations. In that, I was wrong. 
Sarbanes-Oxley has had a much more profound impact in the areas of internal control and 
limitation of management advisory services provided by CPA firms than it has had in the 
actual reporting arena. 
When I began to focus on stock-based compensation plans, it soon became 
obvious that in spite ofFASB Statement 123 most of these corporations (a staggering 41 
of 50, or 82 percent) were continuing to use the intrinsic value method ofreporting these 
plans. As I stated earlier, some of these corporations were even belligerent about having 
to provide the proforma information required by Statement 123. Many accounting 
industry insiders have noted that Sarbanes-Oxley was quickly written and passed and that 
it will take time and revision before the true intent of the law becomes a reality. I 
definitely found this to be true in the area ofreporting, particularly with respect to stock-
based compensation plans. 
It is difficult to assess the successes and failures of Sarbanes-Oxley when so many 
problems and questions remain. There seem to be many unintentional repercussions of 
the legislation partly due to the hasty nature with which SOX was passed. 
At the time Sarbanes-Oxley was being implemented, the national economy was 
suffering a downturn due in large part to the lack of investor confidence. Many people 
believe that Sarbanes-Oxley has impeded the economy's recovery by stifling CEOs with 
rules and regulations. The consequences created by this new legislation have created a 
new brand of executive who is increasingly conservative. 
"Managers of successful companies must take business 
risks. The directors who oversee them must encourage 
them to do so. I want to be clean using business judgment; 
taking risks; and even losing money when a risk worth 
taking materializes, does not act against the notion of good 
corporate governance. In my view, good corporate 
governance informs good business judgment. It 
compliments risk taking" (Millstein, 2003). 
It is imperative that leading executives realize that Sarbanes-Oxley 
attempts to increase investor confidence through executive reliability. It 
does not mean that leaders cannot continue to take business risks. It just 
implies that the risks taken must be legal and non-misleading in nature and 
in the event of failure; executives must continue to be truthful to investors 
in their disclosures. In order for the economy to improve CEOs must once 
again take risks in order to increase company profitability. 
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"The Sarbanes-Oxley Act and stringent new oversight of the accounting 
profession are causing friction in the once-smooth relationship between management and 
outside auditors" (Farrell & Backover, 2003). With the fall of major corporations also 
came the demise of the aura of the auditing profession as watchdogs of investor well-
being. Arthur Anderson's disappearance increased the vulnerability of the remaining 
firms. Under Sarbanes-Oxley, auditors found their current practices under tremendous 
scrutiny. It is hard to pin down exactly when outside auditors actually became company 
insiders. The accounting industry realized that there was higher profitability to be 
experienced in selling consulting services than in selling quality audits. Auditors began 
advising executives on the best way to cheat the system while turning a blind eye to 
questionable accounting practices. 
With the passage of Sarbanes-Oxley auditors now find themselves in a real 
dilemma. Gone are the days where accounting firms could sell unlimited consulting 
services to a company and audit the same company. Auditors must now scrutinize 
~-
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financial statements and accounting practices. Many firms have pressed companies for 
restatement of prior year financial statements. 
"Last summer, the first wave of these signatures arrived at the SEC without much 
incident. But if some of the current battles result in restatements, those signatures could 
come back to haunt their owners. "You will see an unbelievable amount of finger-
pointing in the next few months from CEOs that all signed off last August" (Farrell & 
Backover, 2003). 
Already some companies are siding with the auditors and showing their 
executives the door. It remains to be seen what type of relationship between auditors and 
executives will be created in the post Sarbanes-Oxley era. 
Along with Sarbanes-Oxley came increased compliance costs. Companies must 
pay for internal control programs as well as increased insurance costs for both executives 
and board members. These increased costs have made more public companies rethink the 
benefits associated with being a public company. 
"The number of U.S. public companies to announce 
privatization plans has continued to steadily rise since the 
inauguration of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act. Privatization 
transaction announcements increase 30 percent following 
the legislation's enactment from August 2002 to November 
2003, in comparison to the 16-month period preceding the 
Act's initiation form April 2001 to July 2002" (Grant 
Thornton Press Release, 12/15/2003). 
There are many benefits to be found in going private. "By going private, 
companies can greatly reduce their level of risk associated with shareholder litigation, 
while cutting costs and regaining a sense of control and confidentiality. For many 
companies, theses benefits are very appealing" (Grant Thornton Press Release, 
12/15/2003). It is important to note that many of the companies going private were really 
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public companies in name only. Also of considerable importance is the slow down being 
experienced in the IPO market. Many companies who had previously considered going 
public are changing their minds and are staying private. 
Sarbanes-Oxley came out of the remains of a corporate culture created by failure 
at every level of the system. 
"We looked away as directors gave free reign to CEOs and 
management. We looked away from unprecedented CEO 
compensation. We looked away as accountants, bankers, 
and lawyers replaced responsibilities to the corporation and 
it shareholders with loyalty to the management team that 
hired them. And as shareholders, we stopped paying 
attention; we stopped reading footnotes. We were so 
enamored by performance that we just didn't care about 
why and how it was happening" (Millstein, 2003). 
Because of this massive failure at every level, Sarbanes-Oxley will face many challenges 
associated with being a hastily passed piece of legislation. One of the most interesting 
moments in the near future regarding the effectiveness of Sarbanes-Oxley will be the trial 
ofHealthSouth's former CEO Richard Scrushy. As of December Scrushy's lawyers were 
planning a lawsuit regarding the constitutional validity of section 906's criminal 
penalties. Scrushy's lawyers contend that the wording of this particular segment is too 
vague and should be considered void (Taub, 12/11/2003). 
The Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 seeks to prevent the reoccurrence of recent 
scandals by increasing corporate accountability, enhancing financial disclosure, 
strengthening audit committees, and creating new and harsh criminal penalties for 
violations" (The Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002: Effect on the Securitization Industry, 
2002). Sarbanes-Oxley has been surrounded by a cloud of skepticism, but continues to 
forge ahead towards the goal of returning the corporation back to the shareholders. A 
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difficult road lies ahead but these two sections of the Act seek to add support to investors 
by requiring top-level executives to put their own futures on the line and certify that the 
company's financial statements are to their best knowledge correct and non-misleading. 
"How real is corporate reform? The test will come in the next bull market, when 
the temptation to cut comers will be back in force. Just avoiding jail should not be the 
goal here ... It should be building great companies. That will depend on whether these 
key groups have embraced the spirit of reform or just its letter" (Byrnes, Henry, Thornton 
& Dwyer, 2003). 
, 
Appendix A 
Fortune 50 Companies, 2001 
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Verizon Communications 
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Fannie Mae 













Procter & Gamble 
Merril Lynch 
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